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The Tower of David:
Social Order in a Vertical Community
Manuel A. Gómez*
INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 2012, a sting commando operation that involved more than
one hundred National Guard troops, members of the anti-kidnapping
Special Force Unit, and the local police stormed into la Torre de David (the
“Tower of David” or “TOD”), an unfinished and abandoned skyscraper in
downtown Caracas, Venezuela. The building, which had been occupied by
squatters since 2007, was suspected of serving as the hideout of a criminal
organization responsible for the kidnapping of a Costa Rican diplomat that
occurred a few days before April 9. The operation came as no surprise to
the general public because of the tower’s bad reputation as a crime-ridden
place where drug trafficking and other dangerous activities were allegedly
commonplace. After hours of searching the entire building and its
surroundings, the police found no signs of the kidnapped diplomat or his
captors.
Furthermore, the police did not find any evidence of criminal activities
occurring in the building, nor any of the alleged widespread drug trafficking
so widely rumored. The suspicion of TOD being a crime scene turned out
to be unfounded. The true discovery was, instead, the existence of a
reasonably well-organized community inside the otherwise derelict office
building. Since its initial occupation five years earlier, TOD had become
the residence—not of criminals, but instead—of several hundred displaced
families, most of them who had lost their homes to natural disasters, or who
relocated from the suburbs seeking better work opportunities in the heart of
Caracas, the Venezuelan capital. Despite the precarious conditions of the
abandoned building, which at the time of the initial occupation lacked
electricity, sewage, running water, and most internal walls and windows;
the first squatters made it their home, and gradually repurposed it and
transformed it into a self-contained vertical community.1
The generally negative connotation attributed to TOD, and its
association with chaos, lawlessness, the criminal underworld, and other

*
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1 ALFREDO BRILLEMBOURG & HUBERT KLUMPNER, TORRE DAVID: INFORMAL VERTICAL
COMMUNITIES 33 (2013) [hereinafter Brillembourg, Torre David].
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“urban ills”2 seem to be more a product of media portrayal and commercial
exploitation than reality. A number of recent films,3 TV shows,4 books,5
and even a sub-segment of the tourism industry,6 have contributed to
highlight the upsurge of a slum culture and its alleged role in contributing to
foster anti-social behavior, poverty, and unhealthy living conditions.7 In the
particular case of TOD, the media depiction of the occupation has been
generally consistent with this negative view.8 For example, an episode of
the famous TV show Homeland, titled “Tower of David,” which aired on
October of 2013, depicted TOD as a lawless place run by a group of
mercenaries led by “El Niño,” which happens to be the same nickname of
TOD’s main leader. The difference is that the real “El Niño” is not a
mercenary but an evangelical pastor.
In the real TOD, within months of the initial occupations, the first
residents worked toward adapting the interior of the building to
accommodate their needs, and set the foundations for a permanent
community that spread from the ground level to the twenty-eight floor.
Soon thereafter, the otherwise inhabitable structure boasted a makeshift
intricate plumbing system resembling a Rube-Goldberg contraption,9 but
which provided running water to residents from the city main all the way
into their apartments.10 The electrical power was initially taken from the
city’s street poles via a web of rigged wires and switchbox. However, after
2 GERALD D. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE SLUM: ETHNICITY AND TERRITORY IN THE
INNER CITY 3 (U. Chicago Press 1968) [hereinafter Gerald Suttles, Social Order of the Slum].
3 See, e.g., CITY OF GOD (Cidade de Deus) (O2 Films, 2002), which depicts the crime-ridden
slums (favelas) of Rio de Janeiro, or SLUMDOG MILLIONAIRE (Warner Brothers, 2008), which portrays
the challenges of life in a Mumbai shantytown.
4 Homeland, Season 3, Episode 3, (Showtime, October 2013).
5 See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS (Verso, 2007), JANICE PERLMAN, FAVELA: FOUR
DECADES OF LIVING ON THE EDGE IN RIO DE JANEIRO (Oxford University Press, 2011), TOBIAS HECHT,
AT HOME IN THE STREET: STREET CHILDREN OF NORTHEAST BRAZIL (Cambridge University Press,
1998), ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD (Routledge,
2004), and, BRODWYN FISCHER, BRYAN MCCANN & JAVIER AUYERO, CITIES FROM SCRATCH:
POVERTY AND INFORMALITY IN URBAN LATIN AMERICA (Duke University Press, 2014).
6 SLUM TOURISM RESEARCH NETWORK, http://slumtourism.net/what-is-slum-tourism/ (last
visited Aug. 18, 2015).
7 ANUPURNA RATHOR, SLUM DWELERS: CURSE ON DEVELOPMENT 14 (2003).
8 See, e.g., Maolis Castro, Invasión: El crimen se refugia en la torre Confinanzas, EL NACIONAL
(CARACAS) April 11, 2012, available at: http://www.reportero24.com/2012/04/invasion-el-crimen-serefugia-en-la-torre-confinanzas/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
9 Rube Goldberg was an American cartoonist, inventor and Pulitzer prize winner who became
famous for his illustrations of makeshift machines that performed relatively simple tasks through very
complicated over engineered mechanisms. Given the popularity of his inventions, Rube Goldberg
became associated with any unnecessarily convoluted mechanism; hence the term “Rube Goldberg
machine.” See RUBE GOLDBERG, https://www.rubegoldberg.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2015); see also
RUBE GOLDBERG MACHINE WIKI, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rube_Goldberg_machine (last visited
Aug. 18, 2015).
10 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 216.
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2009, when the community became formally organized with the creation of
a cooperative association, electricity began to be supplied steadily from the
street into the building through several lines that extended from a city trunk
cable provided by the electricity company.11 A crew of residents working
around the clock was given the task to supervise the distribution of
electricity and make the necessary repairs to ensure that the service
remained uninterrupted.12 TOD residents also built internal walls with
cement, wood, and other construction materials in order to create
“apartments” and other “private” spaces to which they brought in furniture,
appliances, decorative objects, and even painted the walls with colorful
tones, thus creating the imagery of a lively neighborhood.
Common areas were also delineated. As the TOD population grew, its
residents sought ways to facilitate life in their vertical community and make
it less dependent on the outside world by setting up small convenience
stores, hair salons, a bakery, a homemade ice cream shop, an arcade, a gym,
and even a nursery/childcare center. Given that TOD had no working
elevators and no stairs, access to the building was only possible through a
vehicular ramp that motorcycles working as taxis (known as “mototaxis” in
Venezuela) used to shuttle residents up and down the building. Community
leaders decided the allocation of apartments, or “spaces”—as TOD
residents called them—based on different factors, including the age and
physical condition of those in each family group. Given the difficult access
to the building, the lower floors were reserved to the elderly and to families
with small children.
Despite the seemingly private nature of certain spaces allocated to
individual residents and their families, the transfer and negotiation of
apartments was subject to approval by the “floor coordinator” or by a board
member of the organization “Cooperativa de Vivienda Caciques de
Venezuela” (“CCV”) established in 2009. In addition, TOD residents
devised a set of norms governing the use of public and private spaces,
collection and disposal of trash, use of electricity, water, internal
transportation, and general maintenance. The residents, through the CCV,
also set forth criteria for the admission of new occupants into the building,
and created a special monthly fee payable by each member to defray the
cost of common expenses. The community was divided into “floors,” each
under the care of a coordinator. A poster containing a general code of
conduct, a table with the allocation of tasks, and other relevant information
has been placed on each floor for all residents to see.13
11

Id. at 222.
Id.
13 Javier Brassesco, Una Mirada desde la Torre de David, EL UNIVERSAL (CARACAS), Sept. 14,
2011, available at http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/120914/una-mirada-desde-la-torre-de-david.
12
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Such level of social order attained by TOD residents took the outside
world by surprise. The emergence of a well-organized community under
such adverse circumstances also caught the attention of social scientists,
architects, and urban planners. The most salient example was a group
called Urban Think Tank (“U-TT”), which devoted significant resources to
develop a comprehensive plan to maximize the use of the building in a
sustainable, socially responsible, and efficient manner.14 U-TT’s final
proposal was entered into the prestigious International Architecture
Exhibition Bienale di Venezia in 2012 and obtained the top prize, which
helped bring international notoriety to TOD. U-TT proposed an innovative
form of experimental intervention geared to take advantage of the collective
efforts of TOD residents.15 The plan envisioned retrofitting TOD so it
could generate its own power, the installation of an efficient water system,
and other technologies that would improve the livelihood of TOD residents,
and which U-TT hoped– could serve as a model of urban intervention to
emulate.16 Unsurprisingly, U-TT’s proposed plan was met with great
resistance in Venezuela, mostly because of the highly polarized political
environment and the negative connotation attached to the occupation of
TOD.
The occupation of TOD was obviously illegal because none of the
residents had been authorized by FOGADE (the owner) to move into the
building, and much less to modify it for a purpose so different from its
intended original use. Notwithstanding, from a different standpoint, TOD
became an example of a highly organized community with a functioning
normative order that served its members better than the state or any other
external system. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore the
factors that promote social order and foster law-abiding behavior in
communities like TOD, which emerge outside –or even against– the state
and its legal institutions. Following this introduction, Section II of this
article delves into a contextual explanation of the political and social
environment in which the TOD community arose and thrived, its
governance regime including the creation of internal norms, and the
enforcement mechanisms used to materialize the obligations arising from
those norms. Section III, shifts the attention of the paper to a broader
discussion regarding the main factors that contribute to achieving social
order in settings that emerge in apparent contradiction of the official legal
system, such as the TOD community. This section also discusses the
emergence of private norms in such context, their relationship with the
official legal system, and the effectiveness of community-based
14
15
16

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 334, et. seq.
Id.

2014]

The Tower of David

219

enforcement mechanisms. The article concludes with a brief discussion of
how the analysis presented here contributes to the literature on private
ordering.
THE FALL OF A DREAM, AND THE RISE OF A COMMUNITY
1) IF ONLY DAVID KNEW: FROM RICHES TO RAGS
The moniker Tower of David was given to the skyscraper after
banking mogul David Brillembourg, the CEO and owner of Grupo
Confinanzas (“GC”), one of the most influential financial conglomerates in
Venezuela during the decades of the eighties and early nineties. TOD was
the tallest in a six-building complex that would form the Confinanzas
Financial Center. When completed, TOD promised to be the eight tallest
building in Latin America, and certainly one of the most modern. The allglass covered building would have been crowned by a helipad, and the
entire complex was supposed to offer ample commercial parking, a hotel,
and retail space. The formidable ascent of Brillembourg in the local
financial and banking sector during those years, and his business acumen
and audacity, earned him the nickname King David, so it was obvious for
the crown jewel of his ambitious real estate project to bear his name.
Most of Brillembourg’s fortune resulted from his involvement in
construction and real estate transactions, mortgage and insurance, and later
on, from his success in the Caracas stock market. Brillembourg’s financial
audacity was admired in the local banking circles. He had successfully
built and financed many commercial real estate projects in Venezuela,
which gave him enough liquidity to purchase a bank, and other financial
institutions. One of his most memorable transactions, which occurred in
1990 at the pinnacle of his financial career, was the hostile take-over of a
local brewery through a savvy maneuver that reportedly earned him five
hundred million dollars, a notable sum for the relatively small Caracas
financial sector. That same year, the Caracas stock exchange closed with an
all-time record figure of five billion dollars in transactions, which was
remarkable for a market that the previous year did not even cross the twelve
million dollar mark.
The construction of Centro Confinanzas began in 1990, but it was
abruptly interrupted three years later, and never resumed. One of the main
reasons was Brillembourg’s sudden illness and his untimely death due to
cancer, which drove his personally controlled financial conglomerate to a
downward spiral. Another contributing factor was political in nature.
During those years, Venezuelan underwent a profound crisis as thenpresident Carlos Andrés Perez endured widespread street protests in 1989,
two frustrated coups d’état in 1992, and later succumbed to a scandalous
allegation of mismanagement of a discretionary funds account, which
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resulted in his impeachment, imprisonment, and fall into political disgrace.
Although some analysts have attributed Perez’s demise to a political
vendetta, the existence of a general crisis was undeniable. After Perez’s
fall, the country’s leadership went through a difficult transition until new
general elections were held in 1994.
After an apparent return to political normalcy that resulted from the
arrival of Rafael Caldera to the presidency, Venezuela was hit by an
unprecedented financial crisis that caused most local banks to implode and
be placed under a special receivership regime by government authorities.
Many bank directors, including their lawyers, were indicted as a result of a
judicial witch-hunt that sought to find the culprit for the alleged
manipulation of the markets, including the false reporting by the leading
local banks of their real credit portfolio to the regulatory agencies, and
many other counts of fraud. The shakedown had implications on all sectors
of the economy; it also eroded the stability of the government, and the
public confidence on the country’s legal institutions. Almost every
financial institution operating in the country, including those that were part
of GC were affected, and many of their directors were indicted, removed
from their managerial duties, and their property seized.
The special receiver appointed by the government to manage the
troubled banks was given the task to oversee the day-to-day activities, and
to determine whether the institution should be recovered or liquidated. In
the course of the receivership, the assets of many banks and related
institutions were eventually transferred to the General Fund for the
Guarantee of Deposits (“FOGADE”) to further compensate the myriad of
accountholders and other customers who suffered lost as a result of the
crisis. Depending on each situation, some of the seized assets were
disposed of through public actions—as a way to obtain liquidity and
compensate the injured bank customers—while others remained in the
hands of FOGADE or the government-controlled institutions. Numerous
office buildings, some of which were located in the most exclusive areas of
Caracas, and also in foreign cities such as Miami and New York, also
succumbed to this fate. During the receivership, many construction projects
were paralyzed and later abandoned due to lack of resources or
management, and TOD was one of those.
THE ABANDONED TOWER AND THE BOLIVARIAN MISIONES
The barebones concrete structure of TOD partially covered in glass
was boarded off and slowly fell into despair during the next several years
after the government takeover. GC was eventually liquidated, and its assets
—including TOD—were dispersed among different government controlled
entities. In the case of TOD, it was transferred to FOGADE, which became
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its legal owner. Despite a change in its legal status, TOD continued in the
same state of abandonment. At least in one occasion, the government tried
to sell the project for sixty million dollars, but no bidders showed interest.17
In 2014, there were rumors that a Chinese banking consortium had
purchased the entire complex, but the government denied it.18 During all
these years, TOD became a reminder of the golden years of the baking
industry in Venezuela, and also turned into an eyesore in the skyline of an
otherwise modern and prosperous city.
With the financial crisis apparently resolved, Venezuela entered into a
new era. A radical change in the government occurred in 1998 with the
victory of Hugo Chavez, a former military commander who had
participated in the 1992 attempt to depose the government. Chavez vowed
to lead a so-called political revolution that promoted a sweeping
constitutional amendment, a transformation of the government to bring it
closer to the people, and a radical departure from traditional Venezuelan
politics. His initial term was faced with important challenges, including
some corruption scandals related to the management of social funds, a
natural disaster in late 1999 that left tens of thousands of victims homeless
and in need of immediate government assistance, and a nationwide strike in
2003 that shut down the oil industry—Venezuela’s main economic
engine—for almost two months and contributed to the accelerated crisis.
On the other hand, oil prices soared and reached historical highs, which
filled the government’s coffers almost overnight and gave the Chavista
administration an enormous political and economic leverage both
domestically and internationally.
Starting in 2004, the Venezuelan government invested significant
resources in an array of social programs that it called Misiones Bolivarianas
(Bolivarian Missions).19 The stated objective of the Misiones was to
provide immediate solutions to pressing issues such as health, housing,
education, and food; but the government made no secret that it would also
use the Misiones as political tools, and more concretely, to purchase votes.20
Despite the generous allocation of funds to the Misiones, the government
was unable to offer a systematic solution to the different problems that it
sought to address through those social programs.21 One of the most critical
problems was the lack of sufficient housing exacerbated by several factors.
17

Brillembourg, Torre David at 89.
Desalojan a ocupantes de ‘Torre David’, El Universal, (Caracas), July 22, 2014, available at
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2014/desalojan-torre-david-caracas-1025049.html.
19 See generally Manuel A. Gómez, Malleable Law: The (mis)Use of Legal Tools in the Pursuit
of a Political Agenda, 19 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 509 (2013) [hereinafter Manuel A. Gómez,
Malleable Law].
20 Id.
21 Id.
18
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The main ones were the tens of thousands of Venezuelans who lost their
homes to floods and other natural disasters, the ultra protectionist pro-tenant
policies that deterred renters from leasing their property, the complete halt
of the construction industry, and the growing demand caused by the
migratory waves from rural areas to the major cities.
SQUATTERS: READY, SET, GO. . .
In order to appease an increasingly impatient populace, the
government implemented certain protectionist policies such as a ban on
residential evictions; it also froze rent prices, and ordered the suspension of
all pending litigation involving tenants.22 Far from offering a permanent
solution to the problem, these measures were just a temporary fix, and
further contributed to the polarization between tenants and property owners
thus incentivizing the latter to devise creative ways to bypass the regulatory
limitations.23 As the situation worsened and the government became more
radicalized against the private sector, several high-ranking government
officials, including President Chavez himself, began encouraging people to
occupy any unused private land or building without fearing eviction or any
similar action.24 Squatting became rampant throughout the country,25 and
those engaged in it routinely brandished Venezuelan flags to insinuate that
they had government support.26
Once squatters occupied a building the only option left to the owner
was to negotiate directly with them or to rely on other extralegal means,
given that no effective legal remedies were available.27 Although most of
the affected property was privately owned, squatting also affected
government-owned buildings and even public spaces.28 The lack of basic
22 Suspendidos en el país 40 mil juicios inmobiliarios, CÁMARA INMOBILIARIA DE VENEZUELA,
Jan. 26, 2011, available at http://www.camarainmobiliaria.org.ve/articles/1535; see also Decreto con
Rango y Fuerza de Ley contra el Desalojo y la Desocupación Arbitraria de Viviendas, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE, May 5, 2011, No. 39,668.
23 See, e.g., Lorenzi and Martusciello v. AFIVEL, Juzgado Primero del Municipio Iribarren de la
Circunscripción Judicial del Estado Lara, Feb. 1, 2006 (finding a commodatum—gratuitious loan—
contract to be a fraudulent tactic against the rights of the tenant).
24 Teodoro Petkoff, El discurso invasor, TAL CUAL, Jan. 25, 2011; see also Valentina Lares
Martiz, Se desata ola de invasiones por ley de tierras en Venezuela, EL TIEMPO, Feb. 5, 2005, available
at http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1676976.
25 Felipe Benitez, Por Un Pais de Propietarios: Estadísticas, casos de violaciones a la
propiedad privada en Venezuela, Noviembre 2005-11, Nov. 2011, available at http://paisde
propietarios.org/home/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/PDP_Estadisticas_Final1.pdf.
26 Luis Alberto Perozo Padua, Invasores de La Puera exigen que terrenos baldíos sean para la
Misión Vivienda, EL IMPULSO, Dec. 5, 2013, available at http://elimpulso.com/articulo/invasores-dela-puerta-exigen-que-terrenos-baldios-sean-para-la-mision-vivienda#.
27 Gerardo Blyde, Invasiones Legalizadas, EL UNIVERSAL, Dec. 16, 2011, available at http://
www.eluniversal.com/opinion/111216/invasiones-legalizadas.
28 See Brillembourg, Torre David, at 102; see also Rubén Bolívar Idrogo, GNB impidió invasion
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services such as water, sewage, electricity, and a barebones structure that
lacked windows, most walls and even stairs, made TOD an unlikely
candidate for squatting at first glance. However, the building’s location in
the heart of downtown Caracas, and thus easily accessible by public
transportation, lessened such drawback and made it attractive to squatters.
The defining event that drove people to seek shelter inside TOD was a
devastating rainstorm that affected some of the city’s poorest
neighborhoods and left numerous families homeless in September of
2007.29 At first, the occupation, which was intended to be temporary, just
affected the ground floor and it simply involved some tarps, tents, and other
makeshift covers.
Progressively, as more people arrived, and the ground floor became
insufficient to accommodate all the residents, squatters moved into more
permanent quarters in the higher floors, and the community leaders
disallowed the use of tents.30 The residents started retrofitting and adapting
parts of the building to their needs, including building walls, separating
private from public areas, and organizing themselves as a self-sufficient
community. One of the defining moments in the occupation of TOD was
the arrival of an Pentecostal evangelical leader named Alexander Daza (aka
El Niño, “The Kid”) who established his church in the ground floor of the
adjacent building (Torre B), and immediately became the de facto
community leader.31 Daza was instrumental in organizing the occupants,
who preferred to call themselves “neighbors,”32 instead of squatters, or
trespassers, which is how the media has generally portrayed them.33 The
fact that many of the residents were also members of the same church
strengthened the sense of social cohesion, which in turn facilitated the
creation of norms, and fostered intra-community cooperation. Interestingly,
some leaders of the increasingly popular Pentecostal evangelical church in
Venezuela have been instrumental in the recent growth of shantytowns and
the upsurge of squatting in that country.34
a ocho edificios de Misión Vivienda, NOTITARDE, Dec. 9, 2013, available at http://www.notitarde.com/
Sucesos/GNB-impidio-invasion-a-ocho-edificios-de-Mision-Vivienda-/2013/12/10/288017
29 There are some reports of a 2003 occupation, but if it occurred, it was only temporary and
very negligible. See, John Lee Anderson, Slumlord, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 28, 2013 [hereinafter,
Anderson, Slumlord].
30 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 138.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 70.
33 See generally Anderson, Slumlord; Thomas Wagner, Socialism in Skyscraper, SPIEGEL
ONLINE, May 30, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/chavez-anhaenger-besetzen-in-caracaswolkenkratzer-torre-de-david-fotostrecke-82563.html; Javier Brassesco, Torre de David se Blinda Ante
la Incertidumbre, EL UNIVERSAL, Feb. 20, 2013, available at http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/
130220/torre-de-david-se-blinda-ante-la-incertidumbre.
34 See generally RAFAEL SÁNCHEZ, SEIZED BY THE SPIRIT: THE MYSTICAL FOUNDATION OF
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THE ORDER WITHIN
In 2009, Daza led the community to adopt a formal governance
structure through the establishment of the CCV, of which he also became
the president. Members of Daza’s inner circle undertook different roles,
and were also vested with formal titles such as Secretary and Deputy
Manager of Social Services and Finances, Security Coordinator, Electricity
and Water Crew, and Floor Coordinator. In total, the cooperative employed
approximately thirty-three people.35 The formation of a cooperative was
also an important way for the community to benefit from government
programs, including loans, microcredits, and other forms of assistance
offered by the Chavez administration to cooperatives.36 Moreover, the
CCV became the community’s official representative regarding the defense
of the rights of TOD’s residents vis-à-vis the municipal and national
governments, and other public and private entities. One example of this
intermediation was the negotiation between CCV and the utility companies
regarding the provision of water and electricity to the building.37
The promotion of cooperatives and similar organizations became an
important component of the government’s social and economic agenda
since the beginning of the Chavez administration.38 The government vowed
to create opportunities for disenfranchised citizens who had been
traditionally excluded from economic opportunities and from political
participation.39 The support not only came in the form of political
endorsement but also through the passage of special legislation regulating
cooperative associations,40 and the establishment of an administrative
agency in charge of overseeing their activities.41
Given that many government benefits, especially those offered through
the Misiones, were mostly accessible only to those who showed
unconditional support for the Chavista regime, TOD residents were also
pressured to join the ranks of the ruling political party (United Socialist
SQUATTING AMONG PENTECOSTALS IN CARACAS (VENEZUELA) TODAY, 267-305 (Public Culture) (2008);
see also, Brillembourg, Torre David, at 141.
35 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 212.
36 Gustavo Silva, Logros de la Revolución Bolivariana. Razones para votar por Chávez el 3 de
Diciembre, Nov. 14, 2006, available at: http://www.aporrea.org/misiones/a27203.html; see also, Betsy
Bowman & Bob Stone, Venezuela’s Cooperative Revolution, DOLLARS & SENSE (July/Aug. 2006),
available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2006/0706bowmanstone.html. [Hereinafter
Bowman & Stone, Cooperative Revolution]
37 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 216, 223.
38 See Bowman & Stone, Cooperative Revolution.
39 Id.
40 See generally Ley Especial de Asociaciones Cooperativas, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 37,285,
Sept. 18, 2001.
41 See Superintendencia Nacional de Asociaciones Cooperativas (SUNACOOP), http://
www.mpcomunas.gob.ve/sunacoop/.
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Party of Venezuela, or “PSUV”).42 The use of the Misiones as voting
purchasing strategies became one of Chavez’s most effective measures to
engage ordinary citizens in political activism in exchange for tangible
benefits, mostly in the form of cash transfers.43 Because of the secrecy and
informality that characterized the management of the Misiones and the
discretion given to those in charge of the different programs, it is
impossible to know with precision how much has been disbursed under
each program, but the general perception is that in the heyday of the
Misiones the total funds disbursed by the government through these social
programs were about 4.5 percent of Venezuela’s GDP.44 Regardless of
whether TOD residents directly benefitted from the Misiones or other
government programs, and how much they obtained from these sources; it
is evident that they did not rely exclusively on that kind of assistance to
support themselves.
As the TOD community became consolidated and grew in size, it also
encouraged the entrepreneurial spirit of certain individuals who strived to
meet the needs of their fast growing vertical neighborhood.45 As a result,
the community saw the emergence of small businesses, such as a few small
grocery stores, a cafeteria, a school supply store, a beauty salon, a call
center, a day care facility, a tailoring shop, and a video game arcade.46 In
addition, the residents built a church, a gym, a basketball court, and other
recreational areas. The basketball court became a particularly important
space and the subject of strict regulation by the cooperative, which enacted
a code of conduct (e.g., no cursing in the court, no playing without
uniform), sponsored a league, and appointed a sports coordinator to enforce
the rules and organize the activities.47
The cooperative kept tight control regarding the operation of any
businesses established at TOD. Every stand or store that engaged in
commercial activities had to be expressly authorized by the Board, which
even regulated their prices and profit margins.48 For example, those
merchants operating from the ground to the 10th floor “must sell their
goods at prices regulated by the government. Above the 10th floor, on the
other hand, shop owners, are permitted to set their prices at one or two
42

See generally Manuel A. Gómez, Malleable Law.
See, e.g., Decree No. 4.342, Mar. 5, 2006, Mision Madres del Barrio San Carlos Cojedes
[Mission Mothers of the Shanty Town San Carlos Cojedes], art. 1.
44 JAVIER CORRALES & MICHAEL PENFOLD-BECERRA, DRAGON IN THE TROPICS: HUGO CHÁVEZ
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION IN VENEZUELA 42 (Brookings Institution Press 2011)
[hereinafter Dragon in the Tropics].
45 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 210.
46 Id. at 138, 210.
47 Id. at 141.
48 Interview with Pedro G. (TOD resident), Aug. 8, 2014, Caracas, Venezuela.
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bolívares more than the government mandate, taking into account the costs
and difficulty of transportation.”49 Furthermore, some businesses such as
the hairdresser on the 20th floor, operated out of “rented” space, which was
also subject to approval and oversight by CCV. The cooperative also
helped organize a transportation system to shuttle residents from the ground
to the 10th floor through the ramps.50 The system consisted of a fleet of
dedicated mototaxis that served the community around the clock.51
Other services organized by the community were the provision of
sewage and garbage disposal,52 clean water distribution,53 and electricity.54
Some of these services, such as waste management, required coordination
with the municipality. The provision of utilities such as electricity and clean
water were facilitated by the CCV through an intricate web of jury-rigged
pipes, cables, and other connections; and were also possible through an
agreement between the CCV and the local government.55 In this sense, the
CCV became an effective mediator between the neighbors and the outside
world.
Internally, the CCV was at the top of a well-defined governance
pyramid that comprised a President, a Secretary and Deputy Manager, a
Board of Directors (“Junta Directiva”), Floor Coordinators, and also Water
Distribution, Electricity, and Facility Cleaning Coordinators.56
The
ultimate decision-making authority of CCV rested on the President, who
had “the absolute and final say on everything.”57 The authority of the CCV
President and his perceived legitimacy was enhanced by the fact that, as
pastor of the community church, Mr. Daza was also the spiritual and moral
leader of the community. His dual role as top administrator and spiritual
advisor gave him clout and also strengthened his legitimacy both internally
among his fellow residents, and externally in the eyes of government
officials and any other actors that entered into a relationship with TOD.
CCV’s board members were chosen from among Daza’s inner circle, which
strengthened their own social network.
The most influential board member appeared to be Gladys Flores,58 a
49

Id. at 210.
De rascacielos a rancho vertical, TAL CUAL DIGITAL, Aug. 20, 2012, available at http://
www.talcualdigital.com/Nota/visor.aspx?id=75548&tipo=AVA.
51 Andrew Rosati, Caracas is Finally Ending the ‘World’s Tallest Squat’, PRI (Sept. 12, 2014),
available at http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-12/caracas-finally-ending-worlds-tallest-squat.
52 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 214.
53 Id. at 216.
54 Id. at 222.
55 Id. at 216.
56 Id. at 148.
57 Id.
58 Javier Brassesco, Una Mirada desde la Torre de David, EL UNIVERSAL (Sept. 14, 2012),
50
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charismatic woman appointed Secretary and Deputy Manager of Social
Services and Finances. Flores was also put in charge of overseeing “the
third circle of leadership, the floor coordinators, who are charged with
organizing space and ensuring that the building systems on his or her
respective floors are maintained.”59 The remaining board members were
given the task of coordinating core activities such as water services,
electricity, cleaning, and the oversight of the security personnel deployed at
the main gate and other access points to TOD. Although the most critical
decisions were made at the highest level, CCV representatives held
numerous general meetings to which all residents were invited.60 The board
used these meetings to gauge the interest of the community on certain
issues, and to assess the legitimacy of the decisions made by the President
and his inner circle. What resulted from this was a hybrid governance
system of bottom-up democratic discussion and authoritarian decisionmaking by Daza and his aides.61
The CCV Secretary and the Board of Directors handled most
collective and individual grievances.62 Depending on the type of issue at
stake, the norm allegedly breached, the parties, and the potential impact on
the community, the Secretary could act as a mediator by attempting to bring
the parties to an agreement, or simply exercise her authority and adjudicate
the dispute in a binding manner.63 Floor coordinators also played a limited
role by repressing violations that occurred within their floor, and sports
coordinators did the same regarding disputes that arose in their territory.
Some examples of violations included the sale, lease, or transfer of rights
over “private” spaces without authorization; the use of public areas in a
manner contrary to the interest of the community, littering, and trespassing.
Most rules and regulations were posted on a board affixed to the wall in
each floor, which also mentioned the threat of sanctions that varied between
a fine, and eviction from the floor or the community.
The existence of a detailed system of community rules and the
corresponding enforcement mechanisms reveals that the TOD is neither a
“cultural island”64 with norms and traditions radically different from the
ones that exist in the outside world, nor a disorganized society that rejects
traditional values. To the contrary, the social structure and the normative
system developed at TOD are aligned and consistent with the values of the

available at http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/120914/una-mirada-desde-la-torre-de-david.
59 Id.
60 Interview with Irma R. (TOD resident), Aug. 8, 2014, Caracas, Venezuela.
61 Brillembourg, Tower of David, at 148.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Gerald Suttles, Social Order of the Slum, at 3.
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larger society, and its official legal system. One clear example of this
alignment can be found in the adoption by TOD residents of a legallyformed cooperative as the backbone of their administrative apparatus, and a
leadership vested with formal roles. In this sense, one can affirm that the
governance regime in place at TOD mimics the larger society, and even
relies on it to exist despite the negative perception of TOD as an
environment where societal values are subverted and illegality is the norm.
In the following section we will delve more into this concept.
THE SKY(SCRAPER) IS NOT THE LIMIT: SOCIAL ORDER
BEYOND THE OFFICIAL LEGAL SYSTEM
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE REDUX
One of the most critical puzzles that has caught the attention of the
private ordering literature is the interplay between intra-group cooperation
and law-abiding behavior. That is, whether and to what extent cooperation
determines compliance with legal rules. A related query deals with the
relationship between legitimacy and authority; more specifically on whether
cooperation or willingness to follow rules in enhanced by the presence of an
authority, and whether the perceived legitimacy of such authority affects
behavior in any way. In the case of close-knit communities that operate
outside the state apparatus and the official legal system, the interaction is
conditioned by the existence of an internal social hierarchy, which in turn
facilitated compliance with the indigenous order.65 Moreover, high-ranked
or well-regarded members of the community are vested with adjudicative or
decision-making roles that facilitate the enforcement of this private
normative system.66 In the specific case of the TOD community, for
example, such is the role performed by pastor Daza, and CCV’s Board
members.
The landscape of private ordering settings is ample,67 and the
situations reported by the socio-legal literature tend to underscore the
perceived efficiency of these environments vis-à-vis the shortcomings of
the official legal system.68 The significance of those indigenous orderings69
65 See Marc Galanter, Indigenous Law and Official Law in the Contemporary United States 1,
Symposium in Bellagio, Italy: State Institutions and Their Use of Folk Law: Theoretical and Practical
Issues (Sept. 21-25, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Following Galanter, “by
indigenous law [we] refer not to some diffuse folk consciousness, but to concrete patterns of social
ordering to be found in a variety of institutional settings” at 2.
66 See Tehila Sagy, What’s so Private About Private Ordering?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 923, 926
(2011).
67 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 131
(Harvard U. Press 1994) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW].
68 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 83 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, Whaling]; Lisa Bernstein,
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is believed to rest, among other things, on the long-standing multiplex
relationships that bind the members of a given community or social group,
and whose behavior is generally influenced by their adherence to a shared
set of –internal– norms. Voluntary compliance with indigenous norms
tends to be high basically because group members view them as legitimate,
and this legitimacy extends to those in position of authority within the
community.
Furthermore, in those—rare—cases when community
members do not follow these norms voluntarily, there tends to be an
internal enforcement mechanism whereby effective sanctions are applied
against the deviants, and the status quo ex ante is restored.70
Most of the examples of private ordering found in the law and society
literature feature thick descriptions of close-knit communities whose
members are related to each other via intricate social ties based on ethnic,
political, economic, and even religious reasons. Such are the cases of the
Hasidic diamond dealers of 47th street in New York City,71 the Palanpuri
Jains based in Mumbai and Antwerp who now dominate the same industry
at a global scale,72 the cotton merchants of Tennessee,73 the cattle ranchers
of Northern California,74 or the Sumo wrestlers of Japan.75 To varying
degrees these groups rely on their own extralegal contractual regimes. The
dispute processing mechanisms utilized by these communities are also
diverse, and range from private arbitration to consensus building and
conciliation. However, one frequent attribute among these systems is the
use of reputation-based sanctions as a catalyst for compliance. There, the
observance of norms and internal rulings is not necessarily determined by
Opting out of the Legal System: Extra-Legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamonds].
69 See Galanter, Indigenous Law, supra note 65, at 2-3.
70 A distinct, albeit related, issue here is peoples’ cooperation with the authorities in charge of
enforcing the norms or laws. See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Cooperation Why do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 249 (2008), at 249 (“Compliance
and cooperation appear to be largely distinct from one another, suggesting that the reasons why people
obey the law may differ from why they may actively engage with police in the social regulation of
crime.”).
71 See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 61, at 115; Barak D. Richman, How Community
Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 383 (2006).
72 See Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering
into the Diamond Industry, in LEGAL CERTAINTY BEYOND THE STATE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND
THEORIES OF CHANGE (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2013); Manuel A. Gómez, Precious Resolution: The use
of intra-Community Arbitration by Jain Diamond Merchants, 2 BELGIAN REVIEW OF ARBITRATION, BARBITRA 119 (2013) [hereinafter, Gómez, Precious Resolution].
73 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
74 See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 60.
75 See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan’s Secret World of Sumo, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
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the fear of a physical or economic sanction, but rather on the possibility of
losing one’s good name in the eyes of the community, or being snubbed
from one’s social circles. The effectiveness of these types of sanctions is
such that in some cases “being shunned or blackballed by the community is
tantamount to a death sentence.”76
Other examples of self-contained indigenous orders that deserve a
special comment here are Utopian communities.
Historians have
documented around three thousand cases of communes and other utopian
experiments,77 many of which have taken place in the United States.78
Utopias vary along a broad spectrum with regard to ideology, membership,
governance, internal stratification, and economic model. Their overall goal,
however, is to basically propose an ideal social order radically different—
and hopefully better—from the society where their promoters came from.
Utopian societies are generally associated with the idea of a new beginning,
a fresh start, or the return to Gemeinschaft.79 In this respect, utopian
societies tend to be idealistic, or as Sargent has said, “social dreams.”80 In
order to achieve their purpose, most utopian experiments vow to reject
mainstream society. They tend to view any external force as competition or
as an impediment to the attainment of their idealistic utopian goal. As a
result, utopian societies refuse most of the external norms prevalent in
mainstream society, while at the same time promote their own legal order,
which is also why some utopian communities may be perceived as
countercultural.81
It is precisely because of its apparent rejection of mainstream society
and the idealistic ethos of the community that some people have suggested
that temporary communities such as the one that hosts the Burning Man
event be considered a type of utopia.82 But, when looking more carefully
into Burning Man, one quickly realizes that the community’s departure

76

See Gómez, supra note 72, at 130.
Richard Sosis, Religion and Intragroup Cooperation: Preliminary Results of a Comparative
Analysis of Utopian Communities, 34 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 70, 73 (2000).
78 For a comprehensive list of communal utopias in the United States, see DONALD E. PITZER,
AMERICA’S COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 449 (Donald E. Pitzer, ed., 1997). See also William L. Smith,
Intentional Communities 1990-2000: A Portrait, 16 MICH. SOC. REV. 107, 112 (2002).
79 See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 66 (Jose Harris ed., 2001).
80 See Lyman Tower Sargent, The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited, 5 UTOPIAN STUD. 1, 3
(1994).
81 But see Bennett M. Berger, Utopia and its Environment, 25 SOCIETY 37, 38 (1988)
(suggesting a distinction between counterculture and utopia).
82 See, e.g., Rachel Bowditch, The Somatic City: Rehearsing Utopia at the Burning Man
Festival, UC DAVIS UNIV. LIBRARY, http://people.lib.ucdavis.edu/~davidm/xcpUrbanFeel/bowditch.
html (last visited Aug. 10, 2015). For an in-depth analysis of law abiding behavior at Burning Man, see
Manuel A. Gómez, Order in the Desert: Law Abiding Behavior at Burning Man, 2013 MO. J. DISP.
RESOL. 349 (2013).
77
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from the ordinary and its seemingly utopian reaction against the order of
high culture is only superficial, and in any case temporary.83 The
carnivalesque trait of Burning Man creates a liminal space for transgression,
license, and excess.84 Such atmosphere, however, is not promoted to
undermine the external legal order, but rather to re-legitimize positive social
values. This is achieved by energizing the community to participate in a
shared venture (the building of a temporary city), and to experiment with
different forms of innovation in a controlled environment.85
Members of the Burning Man community affirm their allegiance—at
least for the duration of the event—to a list of Ten Principles.86 Most of
these principles87 are neither indigenous to Burning Man nor opposed to
mainstream society, but rather aligned with the external social values of
what burners call the “real” world. That is, the values of industrialized,
western, and liberal societies. Furthermore, in the particular case of the
“leave no trace” principle, it was even expressed in an official US
government policy before the Burning Man community embraced it.88
Another key characteristic of utopian societies that is lacking in the
Burning Man community is the physical commitment of their members and
even their seclusion from the outside world. Although some members of the
Burning Man community may remain in contact year-round, their physical
commitment to the community only lasts one week.89 It could still be
argued, however, that the utopian element of the Burning Man community
does not necessarily rest on its rejection of external social order or its
transient membership, but rather on its proposal of an idealized model of
society devoid of conflict and inequality, and which focuses on promoting
individual and communal artistic self-expression and inclusion. Unlike
Burning Man, utopias routinely demand their members not only to
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See Gómez, supra note 82.
See Chris C. Rojek, Disney Culture, 12 LEISURE STUDIES 121, 121-35 (1993).
85 See Gómez, supra note 82.
86 Id.
87 Perhaps with the exception of decommodification, self-reliance, and self-expression. Id.
88 That is the case of the “leave no trace” principle, which was promoted as part of an effort
during the 1970s to educate the general public to assist in minimizing the environmental degradation
that resulted from a surge on outdoors activities in the United States. See Jeffrey L. Marion & Scott E.
Reid, Development of the U.S. Leave No Trace Program: An Historical Perspective (Jan. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
89 The issue of permanency has been long debated among members of the Burning Man
community. Some view Burning Man as a long-standing social movement that goes well beyond the
annual summer gathering. See Press/Media, BURNING MAN, http://www.burningman.com/press/
myths.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). Moreover, the organization’s efforts to boost its regional network,
the multiplication of Burning Man regional events, the myriad of community-oriented outreach
programs, and even the rise of a virtual Burning Man community in online platforms such as Second
Life, are signs of that. See BURN2, http://www.burn2.org/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
84
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“commit”90 with their physical presence, to observe a strict code of conduct,
and embrace a distinctive set of values, but also to expressly reject or
disavow any external order. Through this idea of commitment, utopian
societies ensure their continuity, the cohesion of their members, and also
guarantee that they behave in accordance with an internal normative order.
Commitment demands that members show their unconditional loyalty to the
community, endure certain sacrifices, and renounce to any outside
influences.91
Members of most utopian communities are also expected to relinquish
or at least share their possessions, and sometimes even their own bodies for
the benefit of the common welfare. Although some utopian experiments
have espoused an anarchic approach to social organization by rejecting not
only external rules, but basically all rules,92 other models feature a clear
normative structure and a complex stratification93 The communities
included in this latter group also tend to require their members to endure
various forms of mortification as punishment for their deviant behavior, and
surrender themselves to the jurisdiction of the internal authorities. This
presupposes the existence of social and political hierarchies whereby one or
several leaders, high priests, or elders take on the role of authorities while
the rest remain as their subordinates.
The best way to illustrate this is with religious utopias, where the
community is organized around a set of spiritual dogmas that contain values
and norms revealed to a few chosen individuals who are in charge of
keeping order and promoting member cooperation. As Sosis found out
after conducting an empirical study of nineteenth century utopian
communes, Sosis concluded the fact that religious beliefs “often entail a
host of rituals and obligations and expected behavioral patterns”94 heightens
the level of commitment and loyalty among members, thus promoting intracommunity cooperation and therefore ensuring the survival of the
community95 This is believed to be the main reason why “religious
communities are more likely than secular communes to survive at every
stage of their life course.”96 It could be added that law-abiding behavior
90

See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Social Organization: A Study of Commitment
Mechanisms in Utopian Communities, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 499-517 (1968).
91 For a thorough discussion of commitment in the context of utopian communities, see id.
92 This is the case, for example, of the anarchistic or retreat communes described by Moss. See
Rosabeth MOSS KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1972).
93 See Miguel Angel Ramiro Avilés, The Law-Based Utopia, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF UTOPIA
225, 234 (Barbara Goodwin ed., 2001).
94 See Sosis, supra note 77, at 70, 72.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 70.
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within these religious communities stems from the belief among community
members that the internal norms and the authorities called upon to
communicate and enforce those norms are legitimate. That legitimacy may
result from tradition passed onto younger community members by previous
generations, or from emotional or affectual attitudes toward the spiritual
dogmas upheld by the community.97
Although the ultimate objective of utopian communities might be
unattainable in practical terms, their members are not immune from having
to cope with everyday issues, including disputes with other members over
the interpretation and enforcement of legal rights. The former demands the
establishment of a governance system equipped, among other things, with
mechanisms of internal social control. These mechanisms may take diverse
forms, such as the court-like Judicial Committee entrusted with dispute
resolution functions in the context of moshavim communities, to the
informal control system personified by the general assembly of the
kibbutzim.98 While most internal disputes are contained within the
boundaries of the community’s own institutions, there have been cases
where disgruntled members have sought the assistance of outside laws and
official courts to help them interpret or enforce intra-community
agreements,99 redefine their relationships, and even to recapture their
utopian values100 The use of official courts—although exceptionally—by
members of a community whose main goal is precisely to distance
themselves from the Gesellschaft or larger society, may seem ironic. It is,
however, an indication that indigenous orders not only coexist with the
official legal system, but the operation of both is intertwined and
interdependent.101
Moreover, there are instances where the use of officially sponsored
courts for processing intra-community disputes is not the exception but the
rule. One example is the law-bound Tuna Court described by Feldman in

97

See Martin E. Spencer, Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority, 21 BRIT. J. SOC., 123, 124

(1970).
98 See Allan E. Shapiro, Law in the Kibbutz: A Reappraisal, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 415 (1976);
Richard D. Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli
Settlements, 63 YALE L. J. 471 (1954); Richard D. Schwartz, Law in the Kibbutz: A Response to
Professor Shapiro, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 439 (1976). For a general description of the general structure
and features of the Kibbutzim, see MELFORD E. SPIRO, KIBBUTZ, VENTURE IN UTOPIA (1956); Melford
E. Spiro, Utopia and Its Discontents: The Kibbutz and Its Historical Vicissitudes, 106 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 556 (2004).
99 See, for example, the litigation involving the Shakers, the Harmonists, the Zoarites, and
members of the Oneida community in US courts during the nineteenth century. Carol Weisbrod, Utopia
and the Legal System, 25 SOCIETY 62, 63 (1988).
100 See D.H. Meyer, Review, 16 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 101 (1981) (reviewing CAROL
WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980)).
101 See Galanter, Indigenous Law, supra note 65, at 5.
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his study of Tokyo’s tuna merchants.102 There, members of a close-knit
community of buyers and sellers of tuna transacting in the world’s premier
fish market process their grievances through a state-sponsored specialized
adjudicatory body, and not through unofficial mechanisms. The Tuna
Court did not stem from local custom or informal practices but from an
ordinance issued by Tokyo’s Metropolitan Government, thus showing that
under certain circumstances “formal law can outperform informal norms by
satisfying the business needs of close-knight merchants while
simultaneously contributing to the shared values that ensure the success of
their future transactions.”103
NORMS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT ON THE WAY TO “SEE THE ELEPHANT”104
In each of the examples that we just described, the idea of social order
rests on a prearranged system of norms that binds all members of a
community. There, law-abiding behavior is boosted by a sense of
normative legitimacy, and further ensured by internal enforcement
mechanisms comprised of effective reputation-based sanctions. While in
most cases the relevant norms are produced and applied independently from
the state, there are also examples where private actors choose to rely instead
on official rules and public institutions. Notwithstanding their usefulness
for describing the rationale behind private ordering in the context of closeknit communities, none of the aforementioned situations shed light on what
happens when community and state-sponsored institutions are absent or
inoperative. In other words, one is still left wondering what could promote
law-abiding behavior and cooperation in an environment like that of TOD,
one devoid of any direct form of external social control or government
authority.
This is precisely the question that John Phillip Reid and others tried to
answer with their studies on property rights, crime, law enforcement, and
social behavior on America’s overland trail between 1849 and 1890.105
During that period, the western territories of the United States not only

102 See Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (2006).
103 Id.
104 As Burns points out, “the phrase ‘seeing the Elephant’ was frequently used during the
California Gold Rush by western sojourners to describe their encounters with strange and alien
situations or exotic and enlivening experiences—something as unique as actually seeing an elephant was
at that time.” JOHN F. BURNS, Introduction, in TAMING THE ELEPHANT: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND
LAW IN PIONEER CALIFORNIA 1 (John F. Burns & Richard Orsi, eds., 2003).
105 See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT (1980); JOHN PHILLIP REID, POLICING THE
ELEPHANT: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1997); TERRY L.
ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER
(2004); RODMAN WILSON PAUL, MINING FRONTIERS OF THE FAR FAR WEST, 1848-1880 (2001).
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lacked a central government but any form of government.106 Many among
the thousands of emigrant explorers who embarked on the conquest of the
west had barely anything in common, except for the fact that they were all
headed to see the Elephant, to find fortune, and to start a new life. People
from all walks of life and from different parts of the world left everything
behind and rushed to the newly discovered California gold fields, or to the
farmlands of the Oregon territory. Popular assumptions were rife that
violence, anarchy, and disregard for property107 reigned during those times
“with no one group having a monopoly on mayhem”108 It turns out,
however, that the seemingly Hobbesian109 environment of bellum omnium
contra omnes110 in the American West was not really lawless, “but one
where people were aware of some notion of social and legal order and
respected it.”111
After examining a considerable amount of historical records from the
California Gold Rush period, Reid and others concluded that the fortyniners112 and their successors understood and respected property rights. The
explorers also established an effective system of governance where courtlike institutions were vested with authority to adjudicate local disputes,
applying their own substantive norms and procedural rules.113 The
anticipated hardships and uncertainty that laid ahead for the emigrants
incentivized them to develop rules of collective action and to forge
partnerships of economic, social and political nature. Their governance
devices spanned from constitutions adopted by relatively small groups of
individuals sharing a wagon train114 to enforcement mechanisms resulting
from the cooperative efforts of their members.
These emerging
communities also develop myriads of miners’ codes115 that regulated the
fast-growing mining activity and the courts established throughout the West
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BURNS, supra note 104, at 6; REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, at 4.
REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, supra note 105, at 3.
108 ROGER D. MCGRATH, A Violent Birth: Disorder, Crime and Law Enforcement, 1849-1890,
in TAMING THE ELEPHANT: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND LAW IN PIONEER CALIFORNIA 27 (PIONEER
CALIFORNIA, John F. Burns & Richard Orsi, eds., 2003).
109 TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, The Institutions That Tamed the West, in THE NOT
SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 9 (2004).
110 Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes, De Cive: the Latin version, critical edition by Howard Warrender,
Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 40ff.
111 See REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, supra note 105, at 5.
112 The term “forty-niners” is a reference to the gold-seekers who immigrated to California from
1849 onward. It is believed that almost four hundred thousand people had flocked to California by 1860.
See RODMAN WILSON PAUL, MINING FRONTIERS OF THE FAR FAR WEST, 1848-1880 15 (Elliot West,
ed., 2d ed., rev., 2001).
113 See REID, POLICING THE ELEPHANT, supra note 105, at 117.
114 ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 105, at 125.
115 BURNS, supra note 104, at 6.
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to decide mining-related claims116 It is true that some groups of pioneers
had a common ethnical origin, religious belief, socio-economic status, and
customs. Not surprisingly, the members of these groups remained bound to
the same social values and cultural identities of their places of origin.117
But those values and cultural identities were far from being homogenous
across the entire population of explorers.
The hundreds of thousands of individuals who rushed to the West
during those four decades encompassed very diverse groups, many of which
had little or nothing in common, but nonetheless managed to organize
themselves in communities that promoted cooperation and maintained a
desirable level of social order. Some of those communities, such as the
ones formed by wagon train mates during the two thousand mile journey
across the Great Plains, were temporary. Others, on the other hand,
acquired permanency and eventually contributed to the development of
towns and cities, which in turn were folded into the political divisions of the
newly-formed states. What is truly remarkable is not how or why the
clusters of émigrés sharing the same value system held it together amongst
themselves after having left their hometowns, but rather how such a
disparate array of different social groups was able to coexist throughout the
Overland Trail and maintain a reasonable level of social order.
One could argue that the Overland Trail communities thrived and
attained order not only because of the cultural predisposition of their
individual members toward law, their legal habits, or the customs,
traditions, and values that they brought from home.118 More importantly,
they were motivated to cooperate with their fellow adventurers, which in
turn may have helped them achieve an acceptable level of social order. On
one hand, the émigrés were incentivized by the possibility of obtaining
material gains for their efforts, and thus fought to reduce any potential
sources of social friction that could obstruct their path to prosperity.119 As a
result, they defined individual and communal rights, established
mechanisms to foster cooperation that contributed to reduce transaction
costs and maximized their gains, and also pushed for the creation of
institutions to enforce those rights.120 On the other hand, as the
communities across the newly populated territories attained stability and
their members strengthened their social ties, their incentives to cooperate
expanded beyond the idea of minimizing transaction costs and maximizing
personal gain.
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FROM THE OVERLAND TRAIL ALL THE WAY TO THE VERTICAL COMMUNITY
There are obviously many historical and contextual differences
between the mining camps of the 1800s in the western United States and the
community that recently formed at TOD. Notwithstanding, both examples
also have important traits in common. First, both the forty-niners and the
TOD squatters rushed to a new life in a physical space full of challenges
and hardships. Second, the anticipation of these difficulties acted as an
incentive for group members to develop their own rules of collective action,
and to forge efficient collaborations of economic, social and political
nature. Third, the presence of a pre-existent set of values, religious or
otherwise, among certain members of the community, facilitated social
cohesion, cooperation, and the promotion of law-abiding behavior. This
can be found—in the case of TOD—in the fact that most community
members belong to and are active members of the same evangelical church,
which also appears to have an important influence on the community at
large. Finally, the indigenous system that emerged as a result of these
interactions was aligned with the values of the larger society, despite the
perception that these communities symbolize a rejection of the official
order.
CONCLUSION
The TOD community is far from perfect, and is certainly not an ideal
social setting. As described earlier, the initial occupation was motivated by
extreme necessity and not by free choice. TOD residents are conscious of
their illegal status, and also acknowledge that their presence in the building
might have occurred in contravention of the official legal system. To them,
however, occupying the building was the lesser of two evils, and a
desperate measure in light of their dire living conditions. Given the relative
seclusion of the TOD community from the outside world and its
inaccessibility from the jurisdictional reach of official authorities, outsiders
assumed that TOD was just occupied by criminals who lived in a state of
violent chaos. The opposite was true. TOD inhabitants were mostly
desperate, struggling people who seized the opportunity of living in the
heart of the capital city instead of the inaccessible and dangerous suburban
shantytowns. Others arrived to TOD after losing their homes and being left
with no other viable housing options. Some had small children or elderly
relatives, so living near their workplace was obviously desirable.
Upon moving into TOD, the residents faced incredible hardship and
formed a community that has worked reasonably well. Far from the image
offered by the media and the popular culture depicting TOD as a dangerous
slum, the community has attained a level of social order aligned with the
values of the wider society. It is precisely because of the distinctive
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features of TOD that some have even denied its characterization as a slum.
TOD residents are sheltered against the elements and have sufficient space
to live in, access to safe water, and functioning toilets. They are not,
however, guaranteed against forced evictions, which is the only
characteristic that TOD shares with slums. Slum or not, the TOD
community has shown that it is not a chaotic place that promotes the antilaw. To the contrary, not only has the TOD community developed its own
normative system, but also its residents have even embraced the official
legal system by adopting the legal personality of a cooperative association,
which has in turn allowed its members to interact with the government and
other private actors.
The squatting of abandoned buildings should not be encouraged or
romanticized for it entails many dangers, including the personal safety and
health of the occupants. Governments should make an effort to assist their
disenfranchised citizens in obtaining adequate housing and to realize their
aspirations of living in decent conditions without having to face undue
hardships; but examples such as the TOD community show that in absence
of adequate policies and government support, citizens are still able to
organize privately and efficiently to improve the communal life.

